These are seven of Raz`s (1977) eight principles of the rule of law. However, Raz also expects that the Rule of Law The Divisional Court[5] and the Court of Appeal[6] both rejected this request, although the Court of Appeal concluded that the procedure of parliamentary acts could not be used to effect « fundamental constitutional changes. » [3]: 2 [6]: [41] The matter was again referred back to the House of Lords. [7] With respect to preliminary issues, the Court held that it had jurisdiction to examine the validity of the Hunting Act as a question of statutory interpretation (could the 1911 Act be used to enact the 1949 Act); [8]: 567 Standing was not contested. [3]: 4 On the merits issue, the Court held that there are no limits to the type of laws that may be enacted under Acts of Parliament, except for express restrictions contained in the Act. The Parliament Act 1949 had therefore been validly enacted under the 1911 Act, and the Hunting Act was therefore also considered an Act of Parliament. Lord Steyn, Lord Hope and Baroness Hale suggested that there might be limits to parliamentary sovereignty (although Lord Bingham and Lord Carswell implicitly supported the orthodox view that there are no limits to parliamentary sovereignty). [3]: 13–15 Moreover, recent judgments of the higher courts in England suggest that the rule of law only protects procedural human rights, such as the right to indefinite detention without trial only for foreigners[9] or the right to torture[10], but not material human rights. As Lord Bridge said in X v. Morgan-Grampian,[11] the rule of law is based on the concept that Parliament makes the law and judges interpret it.

Therefore, the rule of law must be defined using a common law approach. The legitimacy argument emphasizes that the supremacy of parliament depends on the democratic and accountable nature of the legislature; Anything that undermines this status would invalidate the applicability of the doctrine. Jowell points out that this view was strongly supported by Lord Hope[7]:[126] and implicitly supported in other views that laws limiting the accountability of Parliament would be challenged by the judiciary. [8]: 572 The argument, based on the current assumption of constitutionalism, that no authority can violate fundamental rights in a democratic society: these are essential characteristics that cannot be suppressed even by a supposedly sovereign parliament. This view was also explicitly shared in Jackson by Lord Hope, who considered the sovereignty of Parliament to be based on the rule of law. [7]: [107] [8]: 578-579 The courts will, of course, refuse to claim that Parliament has infringed fundamental rights if it has not clearly expressed its intentions. Courts will treat (and may even reject) any attempt to undermine the rule of law with particular suspicion by removing any judicial review of state measures that affect individual rights. [7]: [159] Jackson sparked a debate about the legitimacy of the restriction of parliamentary sovereignty and the theoretical justification for the decision.